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I.

UBER-SETTLEMENT IN THE AGGREGATE

The era of the uiber-settlement has arrived.1 In November
2007, Merck & Co. announced a $4.85 billion settlement with
plaintiffs suffering injuries from its painkiller, Vioxx.2 Plaintiffs'
attorneys, representing multiple Vioxx-injured plaintiffs, agreed
to recommend settlement to all of their Vioxx clients if any one of
their clients signed onto the settlement.'
Should any clients
reject the settlement terms, the agreement directed plaintiffs'
lawyers to take "all necessary steps" to withdraw representation.4
The deal became binding only if 85% of plaintiffs agreed to the
settlement.5
The Vioxx settlement is not an anomaly.
Aggregate
settlements are all the rage: In recent years plaintiffs' lawyers
aggregated settlements in the tobacco litigation,7 the Dalkon
Shield litigation,8 and the Fen-phen litigation,9 to name a few. 10
I See Nathan Koppel, Vioxx Plaintiffs' Choice: Settle or Lose Their Lawyer, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 16, 2007, at B1.
2

Id.

'Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In January 2008, Vioxx agreed to
modify the deal, which now notes that "[e]ach Enrolling Counsel is expected to
exercise his or her independent judgment in the best interest of each client
individually before determining whether to recommend enrollment in the Program."
Posting of Heather Won Tesoriero to Wall Street Journal Health Blog, http://blogs.
wsj.com/health/2008/01/18/vioxx-settlement-plan-keeps-rolling (Jan. 18, 2008, 15:54
EST) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs' lawyers and defense counsel,
however, agree that the language change represents a point of clarification and not a
substantive change to the deal. Id.
5 Alex Berenson, Merck Is Said To Agree To Pay $4.85 Billion for Vioxx Claims,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at Al. On March 3, 2008, Merck announced that enough
consumers claiming to be hurt by Vioxx had enrolled in the proposed settlement for
the plan to proceed. More than 44,000 Enroll in Vioxx Settlement, ADVERSE EVENT
REPORTING NEWS, Mar. 11, 2008, at 21.
6 See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implicationsof CoordinationAmong Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381,
386 (2000) (citing prominent examples of aggregate settlements).
7Id.

8 Id. at 389.
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Yet, the definition of aggregate settlement remains elusive.1 1
The ABA Formal Ethics Opinion defines aggregate settlement as
occurring when "two or more clients who are represented by the
same lawyer together resolve their claims or defenses or pleas."12
Case studies may offer more helpful definitions-the Vioxx
settlement can be summarized as an agreement between
plaintiffs' lawyers and Merck's defense team to settle each
plaintiff lawyer's portfolio of cases. While these agreements take
different forms, their underlying purpose is to resolve multiple
claims outside the courtroom. As in the Vioxx settlement,
defendant's acceptance of settlement is usually conditioned upon
13
acceptance by a percentage of the claimants.
Regardless of its definition, aggregate settlement is
undeniably popular due to the procedure's flexibility and its lack
of judicial oversight. As the Supreme Court makes it more
difficult to pursue class actions, 4 lawyers improvise solutions
outside the courtroom where parties face few regulations when
constructing aggregate settlement agreements. Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8(g) requires a client's written consent to
an aggregate settlement agreement and the lawyer's disclosure of
all other claims involved in the settlement; however, aggregate
settlements remain otherwise ungoverned. 5
While some scholars find the increase in aggregate
settlement
proceedings problematic, 6
others rationalize
aggregate settlement's ability to trade off individualized justice
' Id. at 387, n.4.
10 Id. at 386-401.

1 Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769, 1769 (2005) (labeling aggregate settlement "one of the most important
yet least defined terms in complex litigation").
12 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438
(2006) (discussing a lawyer proposing to make or accept an aggregate settlement or
aggregate agreement).
13 See Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute's Draft Proposal To Bypass
the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision
Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 397-98 (2008).
14 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc.,
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-26 (1997). These cases are discussed at greater length
in §ection II.B.
15

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2007).

See Koppel, supra note 1. The article cites Stanford Law School professor
Deborah Rhode who worries that the settlement "stacks the choice for the client." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Erichson, supra note 6, at 384-86;
Moore, supra note 13, at 396-401.
16
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for efficiency.17 Scholars' justifications for these tradeoffs deserve
attention, especially because current proposals seek to further
eliminate client consent in aggregate settlements. In a recent
article, John Fabian Witt observed that "aggregating strategies
of the plaintiffs' bar... adopt rules of thumb to minimize the
administrative costs of tort claim settlements."1 8 He rationalized
aggregate strategies, noting that from behind a "veil of
ignorance" most plaintiffs should agree to aggregate their claims
ex ante "to increase the size of the settlement pie.., by adopting
the efficiencies of aggregation."' 9 In making this appeal, Witt
minimizes aggregate settlement's impact on individual liberties
by implying that all rational people would consent to this tradeoff
in advance. In other words, Witt justifies aggregate settlement's
tradeoffs by appealing to a sense of fairness akin to the vision of
liberalism expounded by renowned political theorist, John
Rawls.2 °
Even Rawls's liberalism, however, cannot justify the
tradeoffs made in our modern aggregate settlement regime. Witt
relies on Rawls's difference principle 21-making
the least
advantaged group as well off as possible when distributing social
goods-to applaud aggregate settlement's ability to appease large
groups of plaintiffs.
Reliance on the difference principle,

", See, e.g., Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate
Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 744-49 (1997).
18 John
Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private
BureaucraticLegalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
261, 272 (2007).
19 Id.
20 Id. Rawlsian liberalism is possibly the weakest liberalism with regard to its
demand on personal autonomy. Rawls pushes ex ante consent further than any
other major liberal theorist, drawing sharp criticism from libertarian liberals in the
process. Witt's appeal to Rawls stretches Rawls's ex ante justification even further

than Rawls. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 310 (1974)

(discussing Rawls's assertion that there is no single model for a society that
sufficiently addresses the needs of all members). This is not to say that Witt fully
endorses the current aggregate settlement system; instead, he offers his own
critiques of the system. Specifically, both this Article and Witt argue that plaintiff
attorneys' interests should be realigned to better match those of their clients. This
Article, however, focuses on Witt's reference to Rawls because new developments
and proposals to allow ex ante consent in aggregate settlements deserve attention.
Witt's reference to Rawls offers us a starting point for this examination.
21 See Witt, supra note 18, at 272.
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however, exposes Witt's argument to the critique that aggregate
settlement does not respect individual rights.2 2
Witt sidesteps this potential critique by using Rawls's second
principle of justice.23 Witt argues that from "behind a veil of
ignorance" plaintiffs would choose aggregate settlement over
individualized redress. Thus, Witt attempts to justify a system of
tradeoffs as acceptable to our liberal philosophic sensibilities by
merely echoing Rawls's veil of ignorance argument from A Theory
In reality, Witt only appeals to fragmentary
of Justice.2 4
elements of one of the deepest and richest versions of liberal
political thought. He applies these fragments arbitrarily to
explain that aggregate settlement does not violate individual
rights.
Witt's reliance on the "veil of ignorance" takes Rawls's ideas
out of context. Rawls's difference principle is the second of two
principles. Rawls's first principle states: "Each person has the
same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all . ,,"' In omitting the first principle of
justice in defending the aggregate settlement scheme, Witt
avoids confronting the system's most serious flaw-aggregate
settlement is at odds with the basic structure of liberal society.
Michael J. Sandel, The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencumbered Self, 12
POL. THEORY 81, 88 (1984). Witt's argument conflates the rule of maximizing the
minimum-the maximin rule-as rule of utility with the difference principle, which,
in the context of A Theory of Justice, is a rule for fair distribution within a basic
structure of society where other rights that Witt has ignored are prior.
[Rawls] argues against utilitarianism that it fails to take seriously the
distinction between persons. In seeking to maximize the general welfare,
the utilitarian treats society as whole as if it were a single person; it
conflates our many, diverse desires into a single system of desires, and tries
to maximize. It is indifferent to the distribution of satisfactions among
persons, except insofar as this may affect the overall sum. But this fails to
respect our plurality and distinctness. It uses some as means to the
happiness of all, and so fails to respect each as an end in himself.
22

Id.

23 JOHN RAWLS,

POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993) ("Social and economic

inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second,
they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.")
[hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
24 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) (1971) [hereinafter A
THEORY OF JUSTICE].
25 JOHN RAwLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:521

The omission is fatal when one considers that Rawls's principles
are ordered first and second intentionally because "[t]he
principles are serial and cannot be traded against one another;
thus no amount of
distributive benefit can interfere with the
26
priority of liberty."
In citing the difference principle out of its broader
justificatory context, Witt overlooks aggregate settlement's
effects on the law's ability to ensure that "[elach person has the
same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic liberties."2 7 All this is not to single out John Fabian Witt's
work-Witt stresses that "the way we regulate the [plaintiffs'
bar] warrants attention and perhaps even revision."2" In additon,
most scholars ignore questions about invidual rights because the
aggregate settlement scheme fails on this issue. In echoing
Rawls, Witt is obviously concerned about protecting individual
rights within the settlement system. His justification of ex ante
consent, however, is insufficient.
Scholars should care when procedural mechanisms erase or
trade off liberal rights in our justice system. America is a
fundamentally liberal society, and no value is more important
than consent.29 To erode the basic organizing principles that
legitimize our polity as a system of fair cooperation ultimately
threatens the utility of all our political institutions. Without a
general faith that our political system is a fair system of
cooperation, disputes cannot be settled meaningfully. 0
New developments in aggregate settlement-including
proposals to further facilitate aggregate settlement-indicate
that the time is ripe to examine these changes' effects on our
justice system. This piece explores the ways that scholars
rationalize tradeoffs that society accepts in condoning and
encouraging aggregate settlements. 1
This Article does not
26 Linda R. Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1860, 1862 (1994).
27 JUSTICE As FAIRNESS, supra note 25, at 42.

1 See Witt, supra note 18, at 261.

29 STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL

DEMOCRACY 22-25 (1995).
" See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B.

Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Comp., Inc. 1980) (1690); Elinor Ostrom, James
Walker & Roy Gardner, Covenants with and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is
Possible, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 404, 404 (1992).
31 In 1984, Owen Fiss attempted a similar undertaking in Against Settlement.
Fiss's thesis deserves reconsideration in light of the aggregate settlement system's
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suggest that the current settlement system must be discarded;
however, the tradeoffs must be recognized and discussed. The
aggregate settlement system has the potential to better protect
liberal ideas, and any proposal that would further facilitate
aggregate settlement or eliminate individual plaintiff consent
should be seriously examined.
Section II explains why the organizing principles of our
political and judicial rules must withstand scrutiny from
politically liberal objections. As the justificatory foundation of
society's basic structure, politically liberal principles cannot be
dematerialized in exchange for alternative utilities. This Section
also explores how shifts in our judicial rules gave rise to the era
of "uiber-settlement." Section III explains why a sufficiently
liberal society cannot accommodate the tradeoffs that our current
aggregate settlement system requires and cannot accommodate
proposals that would further facilitate aggregate settlement.
Finally, Section IV explores the ways that society can better
manage these tradeoffs. Specifically, this Section critiques recent
proposals to change the aggregate settlement rule and examines
the Vioxx settlement.
II.

SETTLEMENT, AGGREGATION, AND LIBERALISM: How DID WE

GET HERE?

A.

Liberalism, Law, and the PoliticalRegime
Law and liberalism have an indirect relationship. They are
both parts of our larger political regime.2
In the American
political regime, the law is an instrument for the acceptable use
of judicial power and liberalism is its public philosophy. Our
evolution since 1984. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984).
32 See STEPHEN L. ELKIN,
RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER MADISON 74-116 (2006). See generally HANNAH
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (Penguin 1990); BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY
(1984); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); JUDITH N. SHELAR,
LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1986). Elkin argues that Madison
views the relationship between law, liberalism, and the political regime in mind in
constructing a framework for the American political regime. ELKIN, supra, at 19-50.
Going further back, Aristotle and Montesquieu view the political regime as having a
similar structure to Madison's view. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk. 2, 3 (Carnes
Lord trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1984); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk.
29 (Raymond Geuss & Quentin Skinner eds., Anne M. Cohier, et al. trans. & eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1748).
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liberal political values inform our commitments to the basic
structure of society and give this basic form meaning.
America's judicial institutions, actors, and customs have a
generally liberal character.3 4 Liberalism's critical role in our
society means that proposed changes to legal procedures and
legal institutions can be objected to on liberal grounds. While
liberalism cannot inform all legal decisions," the law must not
undermine the values that legitimate the structure in which the
law resides. If the law undermines our basic rights, it may
undermine justification for its own existence.
1.

What is Liberalism?

Identifying liberalism's basic characteristics helps one
understand why these critical liberal traits justify the basic
structure of our political society. "Liberalism," writes Stephen
Holmes, "is neither a vague Zeitgeist nor the outlook of modern
man, but a clearly identifiable set of principles and institutional
choices endorsed by specific politicians, publicists, and popular
movements." 3' All liberals do not enumerate liberalism's major
commitments uniformly because liberalism is a dynamic political
philosophy whose own basic tenants are subject to scrutiny and
revision. 7 John Rawls wrote that liberalism has three "main
features." Rawls defines these features as such:

33 John Rawls writes that the politically liberal values that justify the basic
structures of society form "a moral conception worked out for a specific kind of
subject, namely, for political, social, and economic institutions." POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 11.
31 Stephen Macedo, The Politics of Justification,18 POL. THEORY 280, 280 (1990)
("Commitments to reason giving and reason demanding inform some of our most
valuable political practices. Judicial review, most obviously, helps ensure that
legislative and executive acts are reasonable in constitutional terms: In court it is
not the fact of power but the display of reasons and evidence that counts.").
'5See JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 25, at 183; see also John Rawls, Justice
as Fairness:Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 245 (1985) ("The
conception of the citizen as a free and equal person is not a moral ideal to govern all
of life, but is rather an ideal belonging ...to the basic structure [of society].").
36 HOLMES, supra note 29, at 13.
37 See Macedo, supra note 34, at 281. Macedo asserts:
At its most basic level, public justification has dual aims: It seeks reflective
justification (good reasons), but it also seeks reasons that can be widely
seen to be good by persons such as they are. These dual aims are pursued
together so that, politically speaking at least, there is no independent
standard against which a political theory can be judged.
Id.; see also POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 52-55.
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[F]irst, a specification of certain basic rights, liberties and
opportunities (of a kind familiar from constitutional democratic
regimes); second, an assignment of special priority to those
rights, liberties, and opportunities, especially with respect to
claims of the general good and of perfectionist values; and third,
measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to
make effective use of their liberties and opportunities.38

Similarly, Robert Talisse recently identified five "major
commitments" that liberals hold. 9
He identifies these
commitments as: (1) Primacy of the Individual, (2) Moral
Individualism, (3) Moral Autonomy, (4) Political Noninterference,
and (5) Political Neutrality."
Liberals are not interested in
essentializing the correct number of liberalism's main features
as a public philosophy. Whether "main features" or "major
commitments," the basic priorities of liberals overlap to justify a
system of governance that "gives pride ...to justice, fairness,

and individual rights."41 Liberalism's "core thesis is this: a just
society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its
citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar
liberty for all."42
Liberalism as a public philosophy not only provides
justifiable political values, but also space and opportunity for
those who live in a liberal world to reevaluate and possibly
38 POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 6.
39 ROBERT B. TALISSE, DEMOCRACY AFTER LIBERALISM:

PRAGMATISIM AND
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS 16-20 (2005) (citing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, The Feminist
Critique of Liberalism, in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999); see generally A THEORY
OF JUSTICE, supra note 24; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985);
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White
Beck trans., Macmillan 1985); JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Penguin Books
1985).
40 TALISSE, supra note 39, at 15-20. Talisse provides quick definitions for each of
these commitments (with the definitions shaped and assisted by those cited in the
footnote above). Primacy of the Individual is stated to mean, "[t]he individual person
is the fundamental element...in political theorizing." Id.
at 17. Moral
Individualism is defined as "[tihe good of each individual is morally prior to the good
of groups of individuals." Id. Moral Autonomy "is properly the prerogative of the
individual to identify, select, and pursue a conception of the good." Id. at 19. Political
Noninterference "is justified in obstructing an individual in his pursuit of his
conception of the good only in cases where his action interferes with another's
legitimate pursuit of the good." Id. at 20. Finally, Political Neutrality is defined as,
"[s]tate action and policy must be neutral among the various conceptions of the good
which citizens may rightfully adopt." Id.
41 Sandel, supra note 22, at 82.
42

Id.
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revise the values of their political community through rational

deliberation.43 Liberalism's neutrality and autonomy principles
allow for an evolving consideration of who we are and what
we value, even while we are interpreting the core values
of liberalism. 44 A polity whose public philosophy remains
uninterested in continued consideration of its own constitution
or whose institutional design is aimed only at economizing
particular instrumental ends is likely to learn "that in the
pursuit of results we may consume the ingredients of a
satisfactory political life." 4'

Thus, a liberal public philosophy is

justifiable, not only for the inherent analytical worth of its
claims, but also for the variety of lives that its principles
animate.46
When liberals defend arrangements of liberal values or
prioritize certain values as more deserving of our attention than
others, they do not generate such claims ex nihilo. Liberals have
a broad set of constitutive concerns that aim to square the
practice of our daily lives with the aspirations for coexisting in a
way that promotes human flourishing. 47 Liberalism, despite its
4

See Stephen L. Elkin, Economic and Political Rationality, 18 POLITY 253,

264-69 (1985); LON L. FULLER, Means and Ends, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER 47, 60 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981).

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that self-reflection on our basic
principles allows for our way of life to remain "dynamic." AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 6 (2004) (emphasis omitted). They

write, "[a]lthough deliberation aims at a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose
that the decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a justification today
will suffice for the indefinite future." Id.
4' Elkin, supra note 43, at 270.

Robert Nozick puts the case for pluralism this way:
Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Merton, Yogi
Berra, Allen Ginsburg,... Buddha, Frank Sinatra, Columbus, Freud,
Norman Mailer, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild, Ted Williams, Thomas
Edison, H. L. Mencken, Thomas Jefferson, Ralph Ellison, Bobby Fischer,
Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, you, and your parents. Is there really
one kind of life which is best for each of these people?
NOZICK, supra note 20, at 310.
On this point, Rawls and Nozick seem to find at least partial agreement, as Rawls
writes: "I believe that a democratic society is not and cannot be a community,
where by a community I mean a body of persons united in affirming the
same comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrine. The fact of reasonable
pluralism which characterizes a society with free institutions makes this
impossible." JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supranote 25, at 3.
47 For example, Isaiah Berlin defends pluralism on the grounds that
[p]luralism, with the measure of 'negative' liberty that it entails, seems to
me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the
46
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allowance for liberty of opinion to all, is a thoroughly and
mutually developed public philosophy that draws upon the
resources and mental energies of many of history's most serious
philosophic and scientific works. Even Robert Nozick, who
audaciously opens Anarchy, State, and Utopia asserting that
"[i]ndividuals have rights," maintains that this claim is indebted
to centuries of prior work on contractarian liberalism.48
Additionally, when John Rawls argues for the difference
principle, it is in the context of his massive explanation of liberal
political thought in A Theory of Justice, from which the principle
of maximin utility is inseparable. 49 Even when Rawls advances
the difference principle in the context of A Theory of Justice, he
argues that this massive, detailed account of liberalism exists
within a broader context of liberal justification, which he calls
political liberalism."0
2.

Comprehensive v. Political Liberalism

There are different ways to reasonably operate inside of
society as a fair system of cooperation.5 1 Our basic liberal
principles are politically liberal because they are agreed upon by
overlapping consensus amongst all particular, comprehensively
liberal views of how a fair system of cooperation should
operate.52
All comprehensive doctrines agree on the basic
principles of political liberalism even if they reasonably differ on

great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of 'positive' selfmastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. It is truer, because
it does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not all of
them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another.
ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 171
(1969).

4'See NOZICK, supra note 20, at ix, 7-9.
See generally A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 24.
o See id.; see also Rawls, supra note 35, at 244-47.
51 See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 36.
52 Rawls defines a comprehensive doctrine as a doctrinal view that "however
understood, is usually said to hold for all kinds of subjects ranging from the conduct
of individuals and personal relations to the organization of society as a whole
as well as to the law of peoples." POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 13. He
further elaborates that "[a] conception is fully comprehensive if it covers all
recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system." Id. In
comparison to this definition of a comprehensive doctrine, Rawls defines political
liberalism by writing, "a political conception tries to elaborate a reasonable
conception for the basic structure alone and involves, so far as possible, no wider
commitment to any other doctrine." Id.

532
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questions of institutional arrangements and schemes for the
distribution of resources.5 3 There is no further legitimate way to
reconcile distinct points of view and experiences of individuals
participating in society as a fair system of cooperation.5 4 Political
liberalism lays the ground rules for society's basic structure:
Citizens must engage in politics to compete and choose among
The role of
competing reasonable views of what is fair. 55
liberalism, so described, reflects the principled stance of the
American constitutional regime.5 6
In such a framework, legal decisions are instrumental,
particular, and carried out through-hopefully-well-designed
institutions or through the common, recognizable, everyday
Yet, the everyday practice of law takes place
practice of law.
in a political ecosystem of society as a fair system of
cooperation. Everyday law must act with care towards its own
habitat. Consistent with this observation, political actors, citizen
participants, and judges generally carry in their own hearts and

13 Rawls writes, in regard to the relationship between the fundamental
agreements that bind society in a fair system of cooperation, "we can say that when
basic institutions satisfy a political conception of justice mutually acknowledged by
citizens affirming comprehensive doctrines in a reasonable overlapping consensus,
this fact confirms that those institutions allow sufficient space for ways of life
worthy of citizens' devoted support." Id. at 187.
54 For example, imagine a conflict between interested parties where state
political neutrality might conflict with moral autonomy. While some members of
society might err towards ensuring state political neutrality, others may favor moral
autonomy. Ultimately, this conflict is a political dispute within a fair liberal society.
Generally, by favoring a slightly different tradeoff, neither party denies the
importance of the opposing party's liberal value. When such conflicts arise in the
context of constitutional disputes, we often look for the basic structure of society to
crown a winner in the values debate when, in fact, the architecture supports both
positions. See id.
55 See HOLMES, supra note 29, at 31-36; MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 28-29 (1983).
56 See POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 8-11. Rawls specifically calls
this "[tihe public political culture." Id. at 9.
"' See ELKIN, supra note 32, at 1-18. While Elkin agrees that liberalism ought to
play this sort of role in a good political regime, he suspects that we currently hold
onto two bad forms of liberal public philosophy in "New Deal Liberalism and-free
market conservatism," both of which Elkin believes, "do not help matters." Id. at
266. For another liberal view of the role of public philosophy as described in the text,
see generally POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 23, and JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS,
supra note 25. For a view that sees the same role for public philosophy in the
political regime but disagrees on the suitability of liberalism see MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

346-49 (1996).
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minds values of a liberal character. 58 While most legal outcomes
are formalistic and procedural in day-to-day practice, outcomes
remain legitimate because they are justified by the principles of a
system of fair cooperation. 9
Thus, the basic commitments of political liberalism
measure the justificatory logic of our broader constitutional
arrangements.6 °
When the structural fairness of judicial
outcomes is questioned, arrangements must demonstrate
themselves to be acceptably politically liberal. Judicial outcomes
are not simply the result of a coin toss; they represent the
deliberate exercise of judicial power. 61 Thus, proposed structural
changes to judicial powers should concern not only the legal
community, but anyone concerned with our political regime as
a whole. Acceptable self-governance depends upon a reliable,
common public philosophy, which has, in the case of the United
States, a politically liberal character.
3.

When Liberalism?
In some sense, all political acts are subject to scrutiny from
the perspective of political theory. Michael Sandel explains that
"[to engage in a political practice is already to stand in relation
to theory."62 In particular, the good political regime stands in
relation to theory in ways that are practical and responsible to its
improvement and maintenance.63 Any change to the structure of
58 Alexis de Tocqueville observed that American judges were granted the power
of judicial review so readily in part because "[i]n America, political theories are
simpler and more rational." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 95
(Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago 2000).
"' As Macedo writes:
The conviction that other people should be treated reasonably, that the
application of power should be accompanied by conscientious and open
efforts to meet objections with reasons, is an important source of
sustenance for liberal constitutionalism. This aspiration to public
reasonableness helps explain and justify our commitment to the rule of law
and to judicial review: one law applies to citizens and public officials alike,
and individuals have the right to challenge elected officials to defend their
interpretations of that law in court.
Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues, Constitutional Community, 50 REV. POL. 215, 215
(1988).
6o See ELKIN, supra note 32, at 1-16.
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
62

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencumbered Self, in

PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS 156, 156 (2005).
6
See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 249-53 (1977).
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our government potentially restructures many different
institutional relationships. Even on an abstract level, we can
imagine any proposed reform triggering costly reorganizations
between government institutions, government and the governed,
government and business, business and consumers, and between
various private firms. If institutions are the furniture of our
existence, then there are so many pieces of furniture that the
slightest change in the room will prove a massive headache if we
wish to hold the room together.6r The most dangerous reforms
are the ones that deny that the room can be held together at all.
Those proposed reforms undermine the liberties that form
society's basic structure.
In the material world, politically liberal virtues can do no
more than animate our aspirations for practical, justifiable
governance. Political regimes that make liberal virtues real
cannot also make them perfect.6 6 For example, liberalism values
moral autonomy and state neutrality on competing visions of the
good, but the so-called liberal state seems to paradoxically
undercut these values by coercing non-liberal views to accept the
values of a liberal society. Political liberalism does not impose
this constraint. It stems from the fact that we all share one
' See Charles E. Lindblom, The Market as Prison, 44 J. POL. 324, 329-32
(1982).
65 Rawls, in fact, saw political liberalism as a way for us to take basic
constitutional principles off the table, and allow ourselves to engage in controversial
political discussions while agreeing to respect the basic structure of society. Rawls
was not naive to the fact that basic constitutional questions could be subject to
questioning; indeed, if they are good principles, they can withstand such scrutiny.
Nor was Rawls naive about the fact that sometimes force may be necessary to
combat unreasonableness if it proved resistant. The aspiration, however, of political
liberalism is to serve, as much as possible and as best as possible, as a fair
framework that politics can operate within, and as operating from within, may
appeal out to politically liberal principles for justification. See POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 150-54.
' Consider Alexander Hamilton's thoughts on the matter: "'Why,' say they,
'should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it
is irrevocably established?'" Hamilton answers his own question: "[Tihe system,
though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best
that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an
one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people can desire." A
few sentences later, he adds, "I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect
man." THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).
67 Robert Talisse, Can Liberals Take Their Own Side in an Argument?, in
LIVING IN A GLOBAL WORLD (Yvonne Raley & Gerhard Preyer eds.) (forthcoming

2009); William A. Galston, Value Pluralismand Contemporary PoliticalPhilosophy,
93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 769, 770 (1999).
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material world and hold reasonably plural points of view.", If
liberalism desires to appear as real, it must accept its role as a
general public philosophy that works in the context of a
particular set of governing institutions, cultures, and economies.
In other words, to fit in with its real world counterpartsinstitutions, social mores, shared histories, geographic and
technological realities, and so on-liberalism must give a little to
get a little.6 9
Due to the tradeoffs involved in the relationship between
reforms and the nature of the world we live in, the liberal
critique cannot come from the perspective of formalistic liberal
purity. Still, the liberal virtues that animate our political culture
cannot remain silent on the arrangement of judicial outcomes.
The judicial branch is separate in our political model only insofar
as the separation promotes the public good and protects against
tyranny.7 0 Judicial power that potentially threatens the public
good or retards the abilities of the regime to combat tyranny are
not exclusively the domain of practitioners of everyday law. 7'
Rejecting both liberal formalism and legal formalism, we are left
with difficult considerations about the tradeoffs at stake in any
major reform within the political regime. This difficulty makes
liberal normative arguments about changes in the structure of

6

HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7 (U. Chicago Press 1998) (1958)

("Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the
intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to
the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.").
69 Stephen Holmes writes: "Liberalism will always remain an aspiration. It can
never be fully realized or institutionalized. But it can provide a guide and stimulus
to action." HOLMES, supra note 29, at 41.
70 ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33, 155-60 (2006).

Dahl's analysis of the Madisonian model concludes that it assumes that there is such
thing as a knowable public good and the best way to reach it would be through good
leadership. Id. at 160. However, since good leadership cannot be relied upon, the
separation of powers scheme is meant to align more selfish motivations closer
towards public interest. Id. Dahl also concludes that the Madisonian model's
primary objective is to prevent both majority tyranny and minority tyranny as best
as possible. Id. at 9.
11JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 2-3 (1964). Shklar writes:
The habits of mind appropriate, within narrow limits, to the procedures of
law courts in the most stable legal systems have been expanded to provide
legal theory and ideology with an entire system of thought and values. This
procedure has served its own ends very well: it aims at preserving law from
irrelevant considerations, but it has ended by fencing legal thinking off
from all contact with the rest of historical thought and experience.
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judicial outcomes subtle, not toothless. Generally speaking, law
and economics arguments already make this distinction by
advancing the position that consent and moral autonomy are
practically ironclad virtues never to be given up for utility
or social equality.12 New proposals and developments in the
aggregate settlement regime, however, abandon this view of
liberal values.
B. Aggregate Settlement: How Did We Get Here?
Two trends drove the shift away from individual trials
towards an aggregate settlement system,73 and this Section
provides a brief overview of aggregate settlement's evolution.
First, this Section documents the shift from trials to settlements,
a shift driven by procedural changes that increased trial
costs. Second, the class action suit and other formal methods
of aggregation are increasingly unable to resolve mass tort
disputes. Because the class action has failed to provide closure
for companies seeking relief, lawyers turned to aggregate
settlement as a means to fill in the gap and side-step the
Supreme Court's limits on class actions. Settlement's increasing
role in our society, coupled with the demise of the class action
and other forms of mass dispute resolution, created today's
aggregate settlement system.
1.

Why Settlement?

Several scholars have documented the shift towards
settlement away from trials.7 4 Today, 95% of cases settle. 5
72 See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2
(1960).
73 Some authors, however, suggest that the world of mass tort litigation has
always been governed by an aggregate system in some respects. See generally
Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement:
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004). Our
Article, however, addresses the justifications for a system of aggregation. Thus, even
if Witt and Issacharoff are correct in arguing aggregation has its roots deep in
American history, such a system must be justified.
14 See generally Erichson, supra note 6, at 397-401 (documenting the rise of
aggregate settlements); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study
of Settlement Negotiationsand the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
320 (1991); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 593
(2005).
75 Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get
Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2002).
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Indeed, some theorists suggest that trial represents a failure
in negotiations, suggesting that the question is not "why
settlement" but rather "why trial?" 6 While scholars agree that
the number of cases tried has decreased, their explanations as to
why the shift occurred varies, and scholars offer several
convincing explanations for the shift. First, the increasing costs
and time of pursing a case through trial encourage settlement
before parties bear these costs. Second, changes to procedure
rules, including Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") procedures and
the Rules of Civil Procedure, increased the judge's ability to
encourage settlement.
A standard law and economics primer demonstrates
settlement's efficiency. The familiar story explains that as trials
became increasingly expensive, parities realized that they could
split a bigger pie between themselves if they could eliminate or
reduce trial costs. 7 7 Agreeing to a division of resources before
litigation's expensive trial phase leaves everyone, except, perhaps
lawyers, better off.78 Moreover, litigation, with its variable
outcomes, is a riskier proposition than settlement; thus, where
parties are risk averse, settlement becomes the more attractive
route.7 9
Augmenting this story, Judith Resnick's work highlights
the ways that rule changes encourage settlement, making
discovery more costly. 80 Resnik cites amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that "encourag[e] litigants to end their
disputes through contracts for dismissal or judgment." 81 Judges
adjudicated increasingly complex cases, and their desire to
control these cases helped them develop managerial tools to
encourage settlement.82 In 1983, the drafters codified some

See generally Gross & Syverud, supra note 74, at 320.
" See, e.g., id.; Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State:
Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 609 (2008).
78 Scholars note that "settlement becomes more likely when the trial costs are
larger." Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW
76

PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442, 444 (Peter Newman ed.,

1998).
Id. at 442.
See Resnik, supra note 74, at 609-10.
11Id. at 597 ("[Judges who once were skeptical of devolution of judicial
authority to agency factfinders now permit the reallocation of adjudication to
government officials working outside courthouses.").
82 Id. at 612.
71

80
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of these methods in Rule 16, authorizing judges to facilitate
settlement.8 3
The rise of the MDL panel further exacerbated the push
towards settlement. 4 Empowered by statute, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transfers related cases to a single
district court for all pretrial proceedings. 5 Because the MDL
court cannot proceed to trial, but only resolves pretrial matters,
the judges encourage settlement.8 6 Thus, MDL cases often settle
without even the threat of trial where defense lawyers realize
that judges loathe letting these cases return to a home court for
trial.
These changes made judges more comfortable passing cases
to extrajudicial rulemakers and arbitrators.
Because civil
procedure rules endorse settlement, judges are encouraged to
accept aggregate settlement as an appropriate procedure for
resolving conflicts.
Despite these procedural changes, little
attention is paid to the larger implications that these procedures
have on our system of governance and justice.
2.

Why Aggregation?

As with the rise of settlement, scholars frequently spend
more time analyzing the existence of aggregation than explaining
why the shift occurred. That said, two factors appear to drive the
plaintiffs' bar's move towards aggregation: a desire for increased
efficiency and the failings of other methods for resolving these
conflicts.
First, the plaintiffs' bar increased aggregation to
pursue advantages of scale. John Fabian Witt argues that
Belli's Modern Damages treatise marked a turning point for
the plaintiffs' bar.88
The book "collected and disseminated
information about claims values that had previously been

" Id. at 613. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (enabling judges to consider the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute).
" See, e.g., DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D.
Mass. 2006).
8 See Erichson, supra note 6, at 415-16.
6 See, e.g., DeLaventura, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 150 ("[T]he 'settlement culture' for
which the federal courts are so frequently criticized is nowhere more prevalent than
in MDL practice.").
87 Resnik, supra note74, at 597.
See Witt, supra note 18, at 269-70.
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available only to insurers and other repeat-play defendants." 9
Plaintiffs' attorneys realized the value of sharing information,
and began exploring new ways to collaborate. Howard Erichson
details this shift, describing that Plaintiffs' lawyers "work[ed]
together to plan strategy, conduct discovery, hire experts, develop
scientific evidence, conduct jury focus groups, and join efforts in
countless other ways."9 ° Newsletters, shared databases, and trial
schools allowed plaintiffs' lawyers to level the playing field with
the defense bar by pooling their resources. 9 '
There are many ways that individual plaintiffs can profit
from these economies of scale. Not only do the plaintiffs benefit
from an attorney's knowledge database, but plaintiffs also benefit
when their lawyer represents large groups of similarly situated
individuals.9 2 When the end game is settlement, defendant
corporations will pay more to settle an aggregate mass of casesthey will pay a premium to resolve all the disputes at once.93
Restrictions on class actions, coupled with joinder's
inefficacy, further increased aggregation's allure. In Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor,94 the Supreme Court narrowed
class certification's predominance requirement, holding that
the class's desire to settle could not constitute the class's
commonality. 95 Thus, the proposed settlement cannot supply the
predominant common issue that justifies the class. 96 Under the
Vioxx settlement, aggregation side-stepped these requirements,
allowing Merck to negotiate global peace with diverse parties.9 7

Id. at 269.
Erichson, supra note 6, at 389.
91 See Witt, supra note 18, at 269.
92 Id.
93 Professor Nagareda fully explores the idea of "global peace," the peace that
comes from resolving multiple claims. Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and
Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 n.8 (2002)
(describing mass settlement as a way to achieve "global peace," but noting that
"mass tort class actions are generally not 'global' in the literal sense of encompassing
nondomestic claims" but finding the term useful "to underscore the comprehensive
sweep of mass tort class settlements in recent years" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
89

90

94 521 U.S. 591 (1997).

95 Id. at 597.
96

Id.

See Erichson, supra note 6, at 383 ("What the law cannot achieve formally,
lawyers achieve informally.").
97
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In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,98 the Supreme Court struck
down a class settlement that would have resolved future asbestos
claims against the Fibreboard Corporation.9 9 Specifically, the
Court noted that holders of future asbestos claims must be dealt
with separately from those with current claims.'0 0 The class
action's inability to resolve future claims simultaneously with
current claims drove parties outside of the system where they
could more freely craft future-looking solutions.' 0 '
Beyond the class action, other aggregation methods have
proved equally unsuited for the task of resolving mass tort
disputes. Personal jurisdiction and venue complicate joinder
when plaintiffs live in different states.0 2 Moreover, because
joinder is permissive, plaintiffs must affirmatively seek
joinder.0 3 ParensPatraesuits, brought by a state on behalf of its
citizens, are limited to state-wide injuries and by a state attorney
general office's budget and resources. 10 4 Procedure's inability to
handle mass tort situations led to creative solutions by lawyersbecause the procedures did not exist, lawyers created their own.
C.

What Does The Future Hold?
As attorneys discover the benefits associated with
aggregation-the peace that comes from settling several cases at
once, avoidance of the class action court system, and economies of
scale-attorneys also seek ways to further exploit these
benefits.0 5 The Vioxx settlement exemplifies this exploitation.
In addition to existing methods of exploitation, new proposals
would change ethics rules to further encourage aggregate
settlement. This Section explores these two phenomena in turn.
Section III discusses potential problems associated with both of
these developments.

98 527 U.S. 815 (1998).
9 Id. at 821.
'o Id. at 855-56.
'01 Id. at 854.
102 See Erichson, supra note 6, at 409.
103

Id.

104

BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
See generally Erichson, supra note 6 (discussing the ways attorneys seek to

105

exploit the benefits of aggregation).
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1.

Vioxx Settlement
In 2004, Merck pulled Vioxx, an arthritis medication, from
the market when research revealed a correlation between Vioxx
use and heart attacks and strokes. 10 6 Thousands filed suits
against the drug maker who originally pledged to defend each
suit in court. 10 7 Eventually, however, facing pressure from
judges, Merck announced a $4.85 billion settlement.'08
The Vioxx settlement included provisions that have troubled
ethics scholars. 10 9 Specifically, law firms with large numbers of
plaintiffs' cases agreed to recommend settlement enrollment to
100% of their clients who alleged either myocardial infarction or
ischemic stroke."0 Moreover, "[ilf a client decides not to take
part in the settlement, then the lawyer. . . must take 'all
necessary steps' to withdraw from representing that client.""'
Parties included this provision where Merck feared that
"plaintiffs' lawyers might act in the best interests of the clients
who had the strongest cases.""' Merck wanted to ensure that
plaintiffs' lawyers would not settle their portfolio of weak cases
while holding onto stronger ones. Tellingly, the settlement itself
is not an agreement between plaintiffs and Merck.
The
settlement represents an agreement between "Merck and various
plaintiffs' lawyers."" 3
Also troubling, the Vioxx settlement allowed Merck to
distribute the funds via a "secret formula." That is, no single
plaintiff would understand why they received a particular
payout." 4 Two unions, the Service Employees International
Union and the Teamsters Union, filed suit against six of the law
N.Y. Injury News, First Vioxx Lawsuit Settlement Payments Sent out on
Thursday, Sep. 2, 2008, N.Y. INJURY NEWS, http://www.newyorkinjurynews.com/
2008/09/02/product-liability-law_20080902209.html.
"I Joe Nocera, Forget Fair;It's Litigation as Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007,
at C1.
106

108 Id.

See Koppel, supra note 1. The article cites Stanford Law School professor
Deborah Rhode, who worries that the settlement "stacks the choice for the client."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110Press Release, Merck, Merck Agreement To Resolve U.S. Vioxx Product
Liability Lawsuits (Nov. 9, 2007) (on file with authors).
I" Koppel, supra note 1.
112 Id.
113 Adam Liptak, In Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer's Loyalty,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at A12.
"I Chris Rizo, Unions Sue over Vioxx Settlement, Legal Newsline, June 10, 2008,
http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/213367-%20unions-sue-over-vioxx-settlement.
109
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firms handling litigation against Vioxx. The suit alleges that
because the $4.85 billion settlement will be distributed by a
secret formula, the settlement violates provisions of the
5
Employee Retirement Income Security Act.1
These Vioxx provisions are not an anomaly, however, but
rather the tip of an iceberg.
Indeed, lawyers note that
settlements more frequently contain such an ultimatum-join
the settlement
or the attorney will withdraw from
representation. 116 In OxyContin litigation, at least one plaintiff's
attorney took a similar tact-dropping clients who refused to
participate in settlement. The plaintiffs attorney noted, "[i]f we
truly believe it is in a client's best interest to settle and a client
refuses, there is a perfectly appropriate legal basis to ask a court
11 7
to be relieved of that representation."
2.

Proposals To Amend 1.8(g)
Beyond pushing the boundaries of current ethics rules, some
scholars propose changing the Rules to further facilitate
aggregate settlement."18 Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.8(g) currently requires that a lawyer representing two or more
clients shall not settle the cases in aggregate unless each client
gives informed consent. 19 Furthermore, the lawyer must outline
the terms of settlement that the other clients will receive as well
as reveal the nature of each other client's claims. 120 Those
seeking to change the rule believe that "clients and their lawyers
should be permitted to agree on alternatives to the disclosure and
consent requirements set out in the Rule." 2 ' The American Law
Institute ("ALI") is exploring such a proposal.
The ALI's
statement of principles, considered this past May, would allow
115Id.

Id.; see also John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1221, 1266 (2008) (suggesting that a system where lawyers recommend
settlement irresponsibly could undermine the point of tort law).
116

117 Koppel, supra note 1.

1 See, e.g., Katherine Dirks, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of Mass
Torts: A Proposalto Revise Rule 1.8(g), 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 501, 501 (2008); Silver &
Baker, supra note 17, at 736.
119 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2007).
120 Every jurisdiction has adopted a version of the aggregate settlement rule.
Nancy J. Moore, Challenges to the Attorney-Client Relationship: Threats to Sound
Advice, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 395 (2008).
121 Silver & Baker, supra note 17, at 736.
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clients to waive their right to accept or deny a settlement by
agreeing ex ante to be bound by the decision of a supermajority of
the lawyer's clients. 122 In other words, from behind a "veil of
ignorance" clients could waive their rights to object to settlement
in advance, casting their lot with their attorney's other clients.
Others propose changing 1.8(g) so that, instead of requiring
attorneys to reveal all information about their other clients,
attorneys need only provide clients with a compensation grid
123
outlining other clients' claim types and settlement amounts.
Such a proposal echoes accusations that Vioxx is distributing
settlement funds via a secret formula. 24 Similar to the ALI's
considered principles, this proposal also suggests that a
supermajority of the clients should be able to approve the
settlement terms.'2 5 Clients would consent in advance to these
terms. 2 6
Both these proposals would limit the individual plaintiffs
participation in the judicial process. Under proposals that would
bind plaintiffs ex ante, plaintiffs role in a suit becomes a one-way
122 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.17 (Discussion Draft No. 2,
2007). Although the portion of the principles concerning the aggregate settlement
rule was not adopted, it remains the subject of ongoing discussion. The April 2007
draft proposal specifically recommended that the following circumstances be
required in order for aggregate settlements to be binding:
(a) A lawyer who represents two or more clients on a non-class basis may
settle the claims of those clients on an aggregate basis provided that each
client gives informed consent, in writing, after reviewing the settlements of
all other persons subject to the aggregate settlement.
(b) In lieu of the requirements set forth in subsection (a), an individual
claimant may agree in advance to be bound in a proposed settlement by the
collective decisionmaking of 75% of the claimants represented by one
lawyer or law firm who are covered by the proposed settlement (or, if the
settlement significantly distinguishes among different categories of
claimants, a separate 75% vote of each category of claimants represented
by one lawyer or law firm in the matter), whether proceedings have been
commenced or not. Such decisionmaking authority must be vested solely in
the collective clients and may not be delegated to a lawyer or any one
person otherwise acting in a representative capacity on behalf of claimants.
Id. The proposal goes on to stipulate that clients agreeing to be bound by a
supermajority must be informed of the settlement offer, the costs, and the fees, as
well as the settlement received by other claimants. Id. The proposed rule also notes
that waivers are only valid if the amount in controversy is greater than five million
dollars and the number of claimants involved is at least forty. Id.

123See Dirks, supra note 118, at 526.
124 See Rizo, supra note 114.
125
126

Id.
Id.
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ticket. The plaintiff opts into the lawsuit but cannot opt out-she
becomes bound by a supermajority's rule. 127
III. AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT AND THE COST OF CONSENT
Mass tort settlements distribute a vast amount of our
socioeconomic resources, warranting attention from political
theorists. 128 And, however we structure mass tort settlements,
there will be tradeoffs that need to be made. Liberalism asks us
to measure the cost of how the system affects the broader
constitution of our political life. Arguments for economizing the
mass settlement process must also demonstrate that such
reforms are consistent with our broader commitment to selfgovernance.
Reforms that loosen consent cannot meet the
justificatory burdens a liberal regime requires because such
reforms would damage the practical benefits adversarial legal
input provides to self-government.
Economizing and bureaucratizing
proposals embrace
aggregate settlements and ask those interested in more
adversarial law to give up the adversarial ideal.12 9
These
scholars ask us to recognize that we tolerate an overwhelmingly
large number of settlements already. 3 '
Today's settlement
system works well in many respects but carries structured costs
and inefficiencies that could be eliminated by further reducing
the individual plaintiffs incentive to continue conflict. Reducing
incentive for legal conflict can be achieved by working out

127

Professor Burch summarized the ALI's proposal as essentially requiring

"claimants to opt-in to a procedure rather than to provide informed consent to
settlement terms." Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a
Public Good, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 2517, 2538 n.121 (2008).
128 John Fabian Witt wrote that, "[als much as $250 billion flows through the
tort system each year, a figure that is about the same as the yearly amount paid to
the recipients of old-age pensions through the Social Security system." Witt, supra
note 18, at 262 (quoting Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs: 2004 Update
2 (2005), available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/
Tort_2004/Tort.pdf).
129 See id. at 272. Witt notes:

[Wihile it is true that the aggregation strategy of the tort claims
administration may be in tension with the rhetoric of the common law and
its individualized methods, it is not at all clear, at least in the first
instance, that the aggregating strategies of the plainitffs' bar are a bad

thing.
Id.

130 Id. at 271; see also Issacharoff& Witt, supra note 73, at 1573-74.
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predetermined payoff structures, 131 restructuring plaintiffs' bar
incentives towards settling earlier more frequently, or even by
forcing a settlement on an entire class by majority rule. For
example, the ALI recently considered proposals to amend the
aggregate settlement rule, which allow plaintiffs to consent in
advance to majority-approved settlements .132 Additionally, the
Vioxx settlement included mechanisms to ensure that lawyers
recommend the deal to their clients. 133 Once we overcome the
idealized view of adversarial legalism, which is a fiction in
today's mass tort universe, such reforms become palatable.
Reforms are justified once, as John Fabian Witt has already
noted, "we begin to recognize the tort system as a sprawling
private bureaucracy with a significant role in American public
policy." 134 Then, such proposed reforms are not outrageous; they
just take the system as it more or less exists today and make it
more efficient. What could be so objectionable?
From the perspective of society constituted as a fair
system of cooperation, the proposed and recent tradeoffs present
numerous problems. First, proposed mass settlement "efficiency"
reforms1 35 fail to recognize the priority of liberty. In exchange for
efficiency, such a trade requires the forfeiture of access for some
to due process in seeking redress for a wrong committed against
their personage. 136 Proposals for super-majority consent would
pattern settlements that favor defendants, giving a systemic
advantage to those who distribute mass injuries upon plaintiffs.
Even recent settlement offers, like Vioxx, create incentives for
attorneys to shift costs from injurious firms to the clients who
have been injured. In both instances, fairness is compromised,
allegedly for efficiency. Even if this argument for efficiency is

131 Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 73, at 1573-74.
132 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.17
133 Koppel, supra note 1.

(Council Draft No. 1, 2007).

Witt, supra note 18, at 262.
See Christopher D. Tomlinson, The ALI's "Alternative" to the Aggregate
Settlement Rule: Sacrificing Allocational Fairness and Client Autonomy in the
Name of Joint Gains (May 2008) (unpublished seminar paper, Vanderbilt University
Law School, on file authors). Tomlinson argues that such proposals do not actually
increase efficiency within the system.
134

13'

136 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005)

(discussing the right to redress private wrongs as grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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accepted, efficiency is not enough to recover the costs of
weakening consent.
Second, changing the cost structure for taking claims to
court, or having the ability to threaten taking claims to court,
restricts the domain of contestation for redressing wrongs. By
definition, a plaintiff deserving of reward is an individual rightsbearing citizen who has involuntarily received unwarranted
harm. Changing the cost structure of going to court limits
plaintiffs options more frequently into a structured pattern of
settlement where defendants have an advantage as repeat
players. Moreover, plaintiffs also lose more of the right to contest
the legitimacy of prior patterns of settlement or damages
spreadsheets as legitimate sources of authority for their claim.
Under such conditions, our society surrenders one more
1 37
institutional setting in which we engage in public reason.
Aggregate settlements are one of many viable avenues for
citizens to challenge our public understanding about the nature
of wrongs and what they are worth. 138 Today, however, aggregate
settlement is being rationalized on a strictly economic rationality
that is unreliable in making moral considerations . 139 Such moves
undermine the credibility of justice in society as a fair system of

137Stephen Macedo wrote that "[plublic justification should be a never-ending
commitment. It would be sheer hubris to think that we have, or ever will have, the
whole political truth. We are always learning and confronting new circumstances;
we will always have progress to make." Macedo, supra note 34, at 287.
138 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619, 2648 (1995).
19 Michael Sandel argues that markets sometimes cannot consider "the moral
importance of goods at stake, the ones said to be degraded by market valuation and
exchange." Michael J. Sandel, Professor, Harvard Univ., in The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values: What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets 95 (May 1112, 1998), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/atoz.html#s.
Suffice to say public reason would be an example of a public good that could be
susceptible to what Sandel calls "the argument from corruption." Id. If someone were
to be allowed to purchase the silence of certain points of view, there is a loss to the
moral character of public reason that is not captured in the financial transaction. Id.
Also, Phillip Pettit argues that "[pirotective institutions represent the most salient
possibility" to ensure citizens live under conditions of non-domination. Phillip Pettit,
Freedom as Antipower, 106 ETHIcs 576, 590 (1996). For those plaintiffs who may
have had grounds to dislike the Vioxx offer or who would find themselves in the
'super-minority" under the ALI proposal, the changes proposed reduce the
possibility that litigation serves as a protective institution. Finally, Professor
Goldberg argues that some plaintiffs may not even worry about efficiency-they may
simply be seeking their day in court, or a system that takes their claims seriously.
See Goldberg, supra note 116, at 1266-67.
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cooperation. Ultimately, these moves undermine the credibility
of the principles that justify the economic rationality of such
140
settlement systems as well.
Third, the arrangement of mass tort settlements, as it is
trending now, privileges elites. Newly proposed arrangements
will be between businesses-who distribute wrongs-and
lawyers-who may seek to maximize their personal aggregate
take from a settlement rather than provide representation
that best fits the wishes of each of their clients. Furthermore,
in winnowing out those clients who would reject proposed
settlements, the truth-tracking capacity of the settlement process
becomes gravely diminished. If we accept the liberal premise
that greater variety of opinion and dissent increases our capacity
to make correct decisions, then the likelihood at arriving at a
truly fair settlement on a case-by-case basis and the ability to
correctly track the overall fairness of the settlement system are
jeopardized.
When mass settlement loosens consent in exchange for
expediency, it does so without acknowledging any of these costs.
Nevertheless, such costs are real, and proposed reforms do not
come anywhere near adequately paying for them.
A.

The Priorityof Liberty
The evolving aggregate settlement system loosens the
standards of consent in exchange for an increase in distributional
utility.
Justifications for this system reverse our common
understanding of the relationship between basic liberties and
distributive justice. To reemphasize, the priority of liberty is not
a boutique concept peculiar to certain bookish liberal theorists; it
is common to all liberal political thought.'
It is the spine of our
public philosophy. Imagine the state allowing the torturing of a
Stephen Elkin observed that "economizing requires value statements precise
enough to guide policy selection." Elkin, supra note, 43 at 265. Karl Polanyi's famous
study of the collapse of western civilization into two world wars opens with the
following: "Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark
utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without
annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically
destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness." KARL POLANYI,
140

THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 3 (Beacon Press 2001) (1944).
141 H. J. McCloskey, Liberalism, 49 PHILOSOPHY 13, 17 (1974) ("[Tihe liberal,

like any other serious political theorist, has always insisted that the state make and
act on the basis of value judgments .... ").
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little girl if doing so would make an entire city happy.1 42 Or
imagine the state telling someone they had to marry Mr. A
because experts on marital bliss, your financial advisor, and a
super-majority of your friends agreed that Mr. A would make you
happier than if you married Mr. B even though you love Mr. B
instead.4 3 Imagine the state shrugging with indifference when
large numbers of low-income families start selling organs to feed
their families."'
A rejection of these scenarios comes from our common
understanding of the priority of liberty. Citizens, as free and
equal persons, recognize that if some people wish to treat our
existence as a means to advance the greater ends of others, they
must have the strongest justifications. 4 5
When the basic
liberties of citizens are at stake, the collective convenience of
others does not amount to sufficient justification.
With respect to tort law, there is a critical dynamic between
plaintiffs and defendants that should not be lost. Namely, when
the defendants are in fact guilty, they have wronged plaintiffs.
Furthermore, they have done so in ways that the plaintiffs
themselves did not deserve.
It is, of course, important to
recognize that defendants are not commonly punished according
to their guilt due to the economics of settlement and that this
favors plaintiffs oftentimes at least as much as it benefits
defendants. Nevertheless, the aspiration of tort law must remain

142

See generally FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Constance

Garnett, trans., Encyclopwdia Britannica 1952) (making this famous anti-utilitarian
metaphor first).
14 See, e.g., William A. Galston, Diversity, Toleration, and Deliberative
Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
39, 39-40 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).
144 See Sandel, supra note 139, at 94 ("A peasant may agree to sell his kidney or
cornea in order to feed his starving family, but his agreement is not truly

voluntary.").
Consider the famous conclusion of Immanuel Kant:
But in this way also does every other rational being think of his existence
on the same rational ground that holds also for me; hence it is at the same
time an objective principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, all
laws of the will must be able to be derived. The practical imperative will

145

therefore be the following: Act in such a way that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same
time as an end and never simply as a means.
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 429, at 36
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Comp., Inc. 3d ed. 1993) (1785).
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settling actual wrongs on grounds of just dessert, or there
remains little justification for tort law at all.146
Beyond this, there is an undeniable difference in agency if
consent standards are loosened by mass tort settlement reform.
Under such reforms, plaintiffs may find themselves the
unwitting victims of harm against their personages or property
in violation of their rights and also accomplices to settlements
that they would not personally accept. The argument that
consenting in advance, "veil of ignorance" style, is the same as
consenting later rests on two premises that are both false. The
first premise is that any information that one would learn later
does not effect what one deserves in the distribution.'4 7 The
second false premise is that accepting a settlement is simply
accepting a particular outcome, rather than accepting an
outcome and also accepting one particular avenue of pursuing
justice rather than an alternative means.' 8 Similarly, accepting
14 There exists a prevailing understanding that desert can be worked out by the
parties on their own without third-party interference. The most famous version of
this is Coasian bargaining. See Coase, supra note 72, at 2, 4. Experimental testing
does not support the idea that such analytic concepts have the practical reach for
generating the efficient outcomes that they claim. See Elizabeth L. Blake et al., The
Coase Theorem Versus Coalitional Rationality: An Experimental Investigation of the
Empty Core 18 (Aug. 25, 1994) (unpublished study by The Collective Choice Center
and the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, on
file with authors):
What are the implications for the limits of Coasian bargaining? Our results
suggest that one should not expect that Coasian bargaining will lead to
Pareto optimal outcomes across all possible externality situations. In
particular, one should not expect Pareto optimality in games where no
Pareto optimal outcomes are coalitionally rational.

Id.

I The "veil of ignorance" version of ex ante consent is justified based upon the
147
principle that "those similar in all relevant respects are to be treated similarly. With
this precept satisfied, the original position is fair." JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note
25, at 87. In short, the justification for ex ante consent falls apart if we make ex ante
agreements that prohibit us from discovering that we are, in fact, not similar in all
relevant respects.
148 See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515,
521-22 (1980). Rawls writes:
[Tihe members of a well-ordered society are free in that they think they are
entitled to make claims on the design of their common institutions in the
name of their own fundamental aims and highest-order interests. At the
same time, as free persons, they think of themselves not as inevitably tied
to the pursuit of the particular final ends they have at any given time, but
rather as capable of revising and changing these ends on reasonable and
rational grounds.
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the court's ex ante judgment is different from accepting a
settlement ex ante because the court is designed to produce
results that are responsive to public reasons regarding the
fairness of both means and ends as determined by standards of
public rationality; however, this is not so with an aggregate
settlement. As it happens, closing off plaintiffs from a legal
system that is responsive to public reason invites an entirely
separate class of problems for aggregate settlement.
B.

The Displacementof PoliticalRationality

Political institutions give life to principled understandings of
fairness that are required prior to distributing social goods.
Moreover, political institutions play a large part in creating
the particular setting in which our particular human
lives take place. 14 9 If this were not the case, there would
be no reason to care about questions of either fairness or
efficiency. The reason that society expends the mental energy,
physical resources, and time resolving disputes between plural
individuals is because, for all of the joys of a reasonably plural
society, we share the same world. Citizens are plural, but they
are also cohabitants. It should also seem obvious upon reflection
that a citizen of the Untied States does not simply cohabitate
with others who share the territory of the United States, but also
cohabitates with social, corporate, and governmental institutions.
There are many permanent institutional structures that we can
neither change nor ignore. Institutions also shape the behavior
of individuals. Human beings are conditioned creatures, 150 and
liberals going back to Locke and Rousseau understood that

149

See Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:

CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 31, 31 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)
("[Diemocracy is a project concerned with the potentialities of ordinary citizens, that

is, with their possibilities for becoming political beings through self-discovery of
common concerns and of modes of action for realizing them.").
150

Arendt teaches us that "Ithe human condition comprehends more than the

conditions under which life has been given to man. Men are conditioned beings
because everything they come into contact with turns immediately into a condition
of their existence." ARENDT, supra note 68, at 9. Later in the same paragraph she
further explains, "In addition to the conditions under which life is given to man on
earth, and partly out of them, men constantly create their own, self-made conditions,
which, their human origin and their variability notwithstanding, possess the same

conditioning power as natural things." Id.
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human beings could, and in fact, need to be educated and
disciplined.15 1
Loosening consent requirements in mass tort settlements
potentially changes the perception for the system's participants
of what values are more important than others. When a society
changes the priority of institutional rewards, that society also
changes the behavioral reinforcement for those who participate
in the system.5 2
Particularly, in reversing the priority of
liberty and making the economic rationality of distribution the
most important principle, aggregate settlements modify the
institutional reinforcement that citizens should, as a general
"' Jean-Jacques Rousseau opens Emile with the statement, "God makes all
things good; man meddles with them and they become evil." JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, EMILE: OR, ON EDUCATION 3 (Barbara Foxley trans., Everyman Books

1992). He later writes, as a preparatory comment on education, "[wie are born weak,
we need strength; helpless, we need aid; foolish, we need reason. All that we lack at
birth, all that we need when we come to man's estate, is the gift of education." Id. at
4. John Locke writes about discipline rather unambiguously:
[T]hat the difference to be found in the manners and abilities of men is
owing more to their education than to anything else, we have reason to
conclude that great care is to be had of the forming children's minds and
giving them that seasoning early which shall influence their lives always
after. For when they do well or ill the praise or blame will be laid there:
and when anything is done untowardly, the common saying will pass upon
them, that it is suitable to their breeding.
JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF
UNDERSTANDING 25 (Ruth W. Grant & Nathan Tarcov eds., Hackett Publ'g Comp,

Inc. 1996) (1693).
152 The effect of mores on laws and vice versa is a deep-rooted part of our
understanding of politics. The sociological impact of law can be found particularly in
liberal-republican thought such as that of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and James
Madison. As an example, consider Alexis De Tocqueville, who questions:
Why, in the East of the Union, does republican government show itself
strong and regular, and proceed maturely and slowly? What cause
impresses a wise and lasting character on all its acts?
How is it, on the contrary, that in the West the powers of society seem to
march haphazardly?
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 58, at 294.
Tocqueville then answers his own questions, writing:
It is in the East that the Anglo-Americans have practiced the longest use of
democratic government and have formed habits and conceived ideas most
favorable to maintaining it ....
In the West, on the contrary, a part of the same advantages is still lacking.
Many Americans in the states of the West were born into the woods, and
they mix with the civilization of their fathers the ideas and customs of
savage life. Among them, passions are more violent, religious morality less
powerful, ideas less fixed.
Id. at 294-95.
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rule, respect the rights of citizens to make decisions for
themselves where appropriate.
Still, it must be acknowledged that loosening consent for
instrumental gains has a rhetorical advantage over the priority
of liberty. It is far simpler to measure the effect of reconfiguring
distribution than it is to measure exactly levels of behavioral
reinforcement of liberal norms. The mass tort reformer can
provide numerical projections in what gains in efficiency can be
made. He or she can give detailed predictions with the accuracy
and precision of modern social science techniques. Those who
argue for the priority of liberty can only offer the vague fear that
an idea will be lost. Still, instrumental reforms and reformers
forget the scope, breadth, and importance of what it is that they
are actually chipping away at by proposing tradeoffs antithetical
to our liberal political values. The reformer's appeal sounds
strong, but it is an appeal for simplicity for simplicity's sake and
not an appeal for solid political judgment. For it would be
difficult to justify the purpose of law at all if it were not
considered in terms of realizing and protecting the best ideas
aboutjustice and fairness as best as possible.
The difference in the two points of view can be encapsulated
in what Elkin defines as the difference between political and
economic rationality. Elkin writes:
Thus, underlying the differences between economic and political
rationality is a different conception of the relationship between
means and ends. Economic rationality relies on an "external"
conception, where means and ends are causally and
contingently related. Political rationality relies on an "internal"
relationship where the end resides in having some activity done
153
well.
On this view, the request to loosen standards of consent can only
be justified if the ends of handing out tort damages are "causally
and contingently related."1 54
The case for using economic
rationality exclusively to address tort settlements is, in this way,
predatory on the idea that truth is either relative or can be
arrived at more reliably through market forces or political elites
rather than by engaging in public reason. The very concept of

1' Elkin, supra note 43, at 364.
154 Id.
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553

tort liability seems to be an institutional
system that cannot rest
155
fundamentally on such a premise.
Therefore, our institutional foundation needs something
more: It needs an account of justice and fairness that can
withstand public reason about what those values mean in the
broadest possible sense of the term. Law must rest on the
premise that others have been damaged without consent and are
entitled to seek recompense under the law in the manner that
they best see fit. The basic questions of redress for those harmed
without consent are challenged in "the forum" and not "the
market."1 56 To move from the one to the other can only be
legitimate if the harmed party consents.
C. PrivilegingElites, DamagingTruth-Tracking
Several scholars raise the question as to whether the
plaintiffs' bar, in accumulating wealth and power, has become
another elite player in the system. In 1974, Marc Galanter
proposed that the "haves" come out ahead in our litigation
system because they are repeat players. 7 Defining the "haves"
as those "involved in many similar litigations over time,"
Galanter identified some repeat-player advantages as including:
"advance intelligence" enabling parties to build informational
records, expertise and "ready access to specialists," "credibility,"
the opportunity to "develop facilitative informal relations," and
"I Id. at 265. Elkin writes:

They seem to imply that since economizing requires value statements
precise enough to guide policy selection, its natural home is within the
executive. Executive officials are more likely than the legislature to be in a
position to offer relatively clear guidance. Or if not, they are at least in a
better position to accept the economizers advice about value selection.
Moreover, executive officials are likely to view their job as instrumentalthe execution of tasks to achieve some desired end.
Id.

156 Jon Elster defines "the market" as a "private-instrumental view of politics"
where the task of politics "is inherently one of interest struggle and compromise. The
obstacle to agreement is not only that most individuals want redistribution to be in
their favor, or at least not in their disfavor." Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum,
in DELIBERATIVE DEMocRAcY: ESSAY ON REASON AND POLITICS 3, 4 (James Bohman
& William Rehg eds., The MIT Press 1997). He defines "the forum" as "the idea of a
transformation of preferences through public and rational discussion." Id. at 11.
Elster also writes that "to create justice" is "a goal to which the aggregation of
prepolitical preferences is a quite incongruous means." Id.
157 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCy REV. 1, 3-4 (1974), available at
http://MarcGalanter.net/documents/papers/whythehavescomeoutahead.pdf.
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the ability to "play for rules as well as immediate gains."15
Today, the capitalized plaintiffs' bar resembles the repeat players
spoken of in Galanter's article. 5 9 The plaintiffs' bar now
operates with economies of scale-sharing data, evidence, and
trial strategies. 160 Large and credible plaintiffs' firms emerged.
Through cooperation, plaintiffs' firms can conduct a Vioxx trial
for as little as two hundred thousand dollars. 161 The plaintiffs'
bar is a new member of the repeat-player elite.
Although the plaintiffs' bar's development benefits clients, a
split emerges. When representing a portfolio of cases-like
the Vioxx cases-a plaintiff attorney may be incentivized to
consider his or her portfolio more than any one individual client.
Thus, when Merck asks plaintiffs' attorneys to recommend its
settlement to an entire class of plaintiffs, a plaintiff lawyer may
consider the portfolio instead of the individual. The individual
plaintiff becomes another "have not" in this system-alienated
from his advocate.
This privileging relationship invites problems beyond the
claims about fairness already discussed. Truth is also vital for
conducting politics in a fair system of cooperation. 162 Recent
work in social epistemology has reemphasized thinking about
truth as a procedural value as something we do for justified true
belief, both in our own minds and amidst a community of
inquiry.'6 3 Broader communities of inquiry are more likely than

158 Id. at 4-6.
159 See Witt, supra note 18, at 261-62, 269.
160

See id. at 269.

161 See Nocera, supra note 107.
162

See

DAVID M.

ESTLUND,

DEMOCRATIC

AUTHORITY:

A PHILOSOPHICAL

FRAMEWORK 85 (2008). Estlund establishes a compelling case that fair procedures

without any epistemic (truth-tracking) foundation are incoherent under serious
scrutiny because they fail to justify why such procedures exist as they are and not in
some other way. See id. at 82.
'6 See
TALISSE, supra note 39, at 103-05; see also KARL R. POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 226 (2d
ed. 1965). Popper notes:
So one great advantage of the theory of objective or absolute truth is that it
allows us to say-with Xenophanes-that we search for truth, but may not
know when we have found it; that we have no criterion of truth, but are
nevertheless guided by the idea of truth as a regulative principle (as Kant
or Peirce might have said); and that, though there are no general criteria
by which we can recognize truth--except perhaps tautological truth-there
are criteria of progress towards the truth ....
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others to voice possible reasons for holding claims to be true."
David Estlund notes that if we care about our institutions only
for fair procedures, we could simply make all decisions by
flipping a coin. 165 However, democratic proceduralism maintains
the fairness of a coin flip while also producing outcomes with
166
acceptable truth content.
Social epistemology is valuable with regard to mass
settlement reform by helping us determine fair damages. The
public good in question is a recognizable and actionable
understanding of fairness in tort law proceedings. Tort law
improves, not only in the fairness of its outcomes, but also
in the fairness of its procedures, through new iterations of
contestation.167
If tort settlement is decided only by the
majority decision of plaintiffs, for example, the question allows
each plaintiff to vote for or against the settlement based
on indeterminate criteria.
Those who voted "yes" are not
accountable to those who voted "no"-in terms of providing
reasons that must be publicly justifiable.
There is no
institutional mechanism that allows for an evolving thought
about the group's interest.1 68 Thus, future decisions, which will
1'4
See MILL, supra note 39, at 2-3, 168.
165Regarding the coin flip, Estlund argues, "[ilnsofar as we think this is an
inappropriate way to decide some question, we are going beyond fairness." DAVID
ESTLUND, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of
Democratic Authority, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 173, 176 (James Bohman &

William Rehg eds., 1997).
" For a discussion of Estlund's concept of "fair epistemic proceduralism," see
supra note 165. For a more detailed discussion, see supra note 162.
167 Stephen Holmes writes that one of the "radically untraditional" ideas at the
time that liberalism emerges in political thought was that "idea that public
disagreement is a creative force." HOLMES, supra note 29, at 33. John Stuart Mill
adds that:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion isn that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those
who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error
for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.
MILL, supra note 39, at 35-36.
11 Michael Sandel offers up the example of rewarding teachers with financial
compensation based upon their popularity. Certainly, aggregating individual
preferences in this situation could be easily arranged to award popularity with
financial compensation. But could we really be sure that popularity corresponds
directly to being a good teacher? It would seem that the only way that we could know
for sure would be to interrogate the reasons students had for liking a teacher to
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be shaped in large part by past decisions, will be predicated on
settlement patterns set by the contingencies of self-interest
rather than public scrutiny.
Political theory calls the value of such repeat thought
and discussion "reflective judgment."'6 9 Reflective judgment is
valuable because it aids in the progress towards truth that the
owing of public reasons to one another provides.17 0 When we
engage with others or with ourselves in our own mind, turning
an idea over and over, we develop a "reflective equilibrium."'7 '
The constant revisitation of current public judgment on prior
public judgments allows us to legitimate public judgments by
holding out the possibility that we can be convinced otherwise by
those who disagree. The current trends of mass tort reform
increasingly remove this type of public legitimacy from the
settlement process.
Mass tort reform that loosens consent standards also limits
our ability to challenge the received wisdom of settlement law on
fairness grounds. 72 Settlements like Vioxx or the new set of ALI
proposals silence those who are the most likely to challenge the
ensure that it was not simply that they were an easy grader, or gave out less
assignments. See Sandel, supra note 139, at 89-90.
169 Michael
Sandel argues "deliberating about the common good under
conditions where the deliberation makes a difference calls forth human capacitiesfor judgment and compromise, for argument and reflection. . .- that would
otherwise lie dormant." See id. at 109. The theory also appears in legal scholarship.
Some propose letting certain bellwether cases proceed to trial so that the market can
price the case. See DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156
(D. Mass. 2006) (noting that Judge Fallon, who presided over the Vioxx suits,
believes that individual trials will help people determine the "real" value of
settlement).
170 John Rawls wites:
[Rleasonable persons are ready to propose, or to acknowledge when
proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what can be seen by all
as fair terms of cooperation. Reasonable persons also understand that they
are to honor these principles, even at the expense of their own interests as
circumstances may require, provided others likewise may be expected to
honor them.
See JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 25, at 6-7.
171 John Rawls writes that those interested in constructing procedures that
"model[ ...practical reason" must believe "the correct model of practical reason as a
whole will give the correct principles of justice on due reflection." POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 23, at 96.
172 Stephen Holmes believes that public disagreements' primary benefit is "a
technique designed to enlist the decentralized imagination and knowledge of
citizens, to expose errors, and to encourage new proposals." HOLMES, supra note 29,

at 34.
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fundamental fairness of established law. Aside from being a
highly suspect way to treat individuals with due process rights,
such proposals systematize an odious elitism. Now, elites will
not only divide the rewards as agreed upon primarily by lawyers
and defendants, they will also breed a contempt for minority
opinion that is wholly immodest when it comes to the truth about
fairness.173
IV. ENSURING LIBERALISM'S PLACE IN SETTLEMENT

If we seek to protect individual consent rights, the best way
to proceed is to ensure that each individual has an advocate who
is aligned with her client, beholden to her consent. Attorneys
must not become more concerned with settling a portfolio of cases
than they are with an individual client; the current aggregate
settlement system rewards attorneys who would make this
tradeoff because the system ignores the value of consent. As seen
in the Vioxx litigation, attorneys profit when their clients sign
onto the deal-regardless of whether the deal is the best solution
for their suit.174 Indeed, attorneys are encouraged to drop clients
who refuse to sign on, further driving a wedge between the
attorney and the individual. Thus, the reforms suggested below
seek to realign plaintiffs' attorneys' interests with individuals
and ensure that plaintiffs can give their informed consent.
These proposed reforms are not designed to increase
plaintiff payouts, but rather to secure basic individual liberties.
Moreover, we attempt to create a system of accountability that is
practically efficacious. Settlement processes and liberalism are
not mutually exclusive, but settlement can be conducted in a way
that protects individual rights.

173

See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?

156-57 (2004).

Decision makers owe justifications for the policies they seek to impose on
other people. They therefore must take seriously the moral reasons offered
by their opponents. If they take seriously their opponents' moral reasons,
they must acknowledge the possibility that, at least for a certain range of
views, their opponents may be shown to be correct in the future.
Id. at 156.
174 See Nocera, supra note 107.
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CurbingAttempts To Allow Ex Ante Waiver of Unanimous
Consent

At the least, we must reject proposals that would facilitate
aggregate settlement by allowing a supermajority of clients to
accept a settlement. We cannot permit plaintiffs to agree ex ante
that they will settle should a super-majority of the group consent
to a settlement. The ALI considered, and did not accept, such a
statement at its May 2008 meeting; however, proponents of the
idea are working on a new proposal that would recognize latitude
for ex ante waiver of 1.8(g)'s unanimous consent rule.
Proponents of loosening consent standards for mass tort
settlement see no appreciable difference between giving plaintiffs
the power to withhold consent the whole way through the legal
process and allowing them the power to consent ex ante. 175 They
imagine that the more we squeeze consent out of the system for
plaintiffs, the more efficiency we appear to maximize as there is
less chance that individual plaintiffs will act as holdouts by
pursuing more for themselves, or for demanding their day in
court, we are asked to believe that everyone is better off.1" 6 After
all, one would expect a citizen to consent in advance to judicial
outcomes in a court of law regardless of whether or not the
verdict is in their favor. If consent to the procedure is legitimate
prior to the outcome in that instance, why not with aggregate
settlement?
What this argument preys on, quite cleverly, is a general
inability to make the critical distinction in consenting in advance
to accept collective decisions generated by political rationality
versus collective decisions generated by economic rationality.
For example, citizens are expected to observe the outcomes of
political elections ex ante because they determine which leaders
do politics in what ways as actors already bound to the basic
structure of society. Citizens are also expected to accept judicial
decisions because the procedures of the court are designed to
uncover the truth of the matter at hand and represent the best
institutional chance of establishing justice for everyone in a fair
175Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.17 cmt. a (Tentative Draft

No. 1, 2008) ("Current law prohibits waiving individual-claimant settlement
decisionmaking, thereby empowering individual claimants to exercise unfair control
over a proposed settlement and to demand premiums in exchange for approval.").
176 See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 17, at 752, 762, 767-68.
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society. Mass tort settlements, as they are trending now, are
neither operating completely inside of the basic structure of
society nor are they offering plaintiffs a legitimate chance to
pursue fairness in institutional arrangements that are designed
to care. The changing standards of consent force plaintiffs to
pursue not what is fair, but the best they can get under a set of
incentives that force plaintiffs to go against their sense of
fairness. These incentives create an undue pressure on plaintiffs
to violate the basic principles of our public philosophy, and the
177
incentives need not exist.
Loosening consent matters well beyond the scope of efficient
resource distribution. In this instance of law, loosening consent
damages the fundamental properties of our governance, our law,
and even the principles that form the foundation of economic
exchange itself. It is bad for the institutional arrangements of
our political regime, bad for plaintiffs, and bad for the mores of
citizens who would be conditioned by operating in such an
institutional framework. There is even a debate as to whether it
delivers utility in the narrowest understanding of distributing
settlement awards.17 Perhaps loosening consent is not even as
efficient as advertised in its resource allocation. Perhaps it is.
Regardless, it is not even a question we should feel the need to
consider. Unless mass tort reformers can come up with better
justifications for why their proposals belong in society as a fair
system of cooperation, there is no need to do the math.
B. Reforms
The Vioxx litigation demonstrates areas of the law in need of
reform. Settlements should not require lawyers to recommend a
settlement to their clients and encourage those lawyers to drop
clients who refuse to sign onto the deal. Rule 1.8(g) should be
amended specifically to prohibit this type of behavior, and

...
Aggregate settlement schemes that unnecessarily deter plaintiffs from
litigating further meet both of the criteria for what we might call situational
coercion. Situational coercion has two criteria. First, in situational coercion, the
incentive structure must present itself as undesirable but acceptable only because
the situation puts the chooser in a position where it is "an offer he or she can't
refuse." Second, the circumstances that have structured incentive to force the
individual into a degrading or objectionable choice must be a set of structures that
need not exist. See Sandel, supra note 139, at 94.
178 See Tomlinson, supra note 135.
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lawyers should seek a client's written understanding of this
point.
Indeed, much as some congressional members advocated for
a United States Patients' Bill of Rights 7 9 so that citizens could
dispute health care decisions armed with information,18 ° the legal
community should similarly consider enacting a Settlement
Group's Bill of Rights. Plaintiff lawyers would present such a
document to their clients before beginning representation.
Potential rights to include in such a document could include:
(1) the right to be informed of a settlement in advance of giving
consent; (2) the right to refuse a settlement offer; and (3) the
right to know about all other claims or pleas involved in a
settlement. While these rights are nothing more than the
current requirements of Rule 1.8(g), providing a list of rights to
clients empowers clients and alerts them to the law's
requirements.
Increased public information regarding settlement may also
help better align plaintiff lawyers' interests with their clientsenabling informed consent. David Luban notes that "secret
settlements"-settlements in which discovery materials are
returned to the defendant and the plaintiff promises secrecy-are
troubling because they deny knowledge of the settlement to the
public.'
He cites Kant for the point that "[a]ll actions relating
to the right of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is
incompatible with publicity."8 2 He approvingly notes that a few
states
have enacted
sunshine
laws
curtailing
secret
settlements. 183 Luban is particularly concerned with secret
settlements because they deny the public reason-the public law
aspect of the legal system is diminished.
In addition to
reinforcing the public law aspect of the legal system, sunshine
laws would also help realign plaintiff attorneys' interests with
individuals.

179 See generally Bipartisan Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2001, S. 889, 107th
Cong. (2001).
l"0 See 147 CONG. REC. S3154 (2001) (statement of Sen. Reed) ("By empowering
health care consumers with information and effective strategies,... the chances
that a health-related dispute will end up in court are drastically minimized.").
"Il David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2648 (1995).
182 Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
183 Id.
at 2651.
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While it may sound paradoxical that increasing the public
law aspect of the court system strengthens individual rights,
plaintiffs would inevitably benefit from these sunshine laws.
When information is publicized, public watchdog groups can
analyze settlements, provide information about settlement dollar
amounts, and rate attorneys for their advocacy efficacy. Such
information would enable plaintiffs to find the best possible
representation and give plaintiffs points of comparison beyond an
attorney's attestation that a deal is "fair." A plaintiff who
consents to settlement under these circumstances can make a
more informed decision. In other words, the plaintiffs consent is
more meaningful.
Finally, increased judicial review of settlements-and
attorney's fees paid under settlements-could disincentivize
attorney misbehavior. Indeed, a federal district judge in New
Orleans recently capped plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in the Vioxx
settlement at 32%.14 Judge Eldon Fallon noted that because
many plaintiffs suffered "life-threatening injuries that could have
prevented them from negotiating fair contracts with lawyers[,]" a
standard fee of 33.3% to 40% seemed excessive." 5
Judge Fallon's vigilance, noting that circumstances
undermined plaintiff consent, may have two consequences.
Attorneys will have an increased awareness about plaintiff
consent issues. Those wishing to charge higher fees will find new
ways to ensure plaintiff consent that can withstand judicial
scrutiny. These methods may take the form of educational
materials or programs educating plaintiffs as to their rights
when hiring an attorney. And, new standards could creep into
the realm of aggregate settlements. Additionally, other judges
may begin reviewing plaintiff consent in similar cases--cases
where a judge has reason to doubt that plaintiffs negotiated fair
contracts with lawyers. Judge Fallon's action creates a precedent
for other courts and offers a warning to attorneys who would
ignore consent.

"' Melissa Maleske, Got Capped, INSIDE COUNS., Oct. 2008, at 13.
185

Id.
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CONCLUSION

While other scholars have criticized proposals to change
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g)186 and the Vioxx
settlement, 8 7 this piece adds another layer to those critiques by
suggesting that these proposals and developments cannot be
squared with American liberalism.
Indeed, eliminating
plaintiffs' consent in an aggregate settlement has the potential to
undermine the entire justice system. Not only should we reject
proposals that would eliminate plaintiff consent, but we must
also continue to find ways to reassert consent within the system.
Clients' consent to settle should be real, informed, and not based
upon an ultimatum to "settle or lose their lawyer."
Oftentimes, resisting economizing proposals based on
principle may appear weak or arbitrary. After all, those who
warn us against diminishing what they claim are important
principles oftentimes appear with arguments too vague, too
difficult to measure, or that are, even worse, utopian in nature.
It would be difficult to deny that, on countless occasions,
principle has been used as a refrain to push back against
progress.
Yet, some principles are necessary in order to breathe life
into our law and society.
Without principles, there is no
justification for why society ought to pursue any particular ends
at all. To come to know what these principles are and how we
keep them relies upon our capacity for critical reflection and
public justification. Public justification must be an ongoing and
enduring part of our political process in as many institutional
settings as we can allow it to flourish.
Economizing at the cost of basic rights may seem a coherent
thought with regard to one particular institutional setting. But
accepting such an argument asks us to commit an error of
omission. For one could not realistically maintain the priority of
efficiency over basic rights if one wanted to consider institutions
as part of a coherent set of arrangements in a well-ordered
society. In fact, such a reversal of priority would be unable to
convincingly articulate what it means to have a well-ordered
society in the first place.
186

See, e.g., Moore, supra note 13, at 401-02; Tomlinson, supra note 135.

See Koppel, supra note 1 (quoting Stanford Law School professor Deborah
Rhode who worries that the settlement "stacks the choice for the client" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
'8
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Our institutions are more than just rules. Institutions are
also the settings through which we mediate our coexistence with
Accordingly, we do well to remember the
one another.
seriousness and complexity involved in institutional design.
Changing the relative value between consent and expediency is
likely a bad idea as it pertains to aggregate settlement. Such a
move is unquestionably a bad move applied more generally.
As a society, we recognize very few justifications for ex ante
consent situations, some of which, like elections or judicial
opinions, have already been discussed. The aggregate settlement
situations discussed in this piece come nowhere near even the
loosest standards of reasonable justification for ex ante consent
in any other fair social choice situation. We are not deaf to the
importance of tradeoff in devising institutional rules. Our society
can either have a fair aggregate settlement system, or it can
move in the direction that aggregate settlement seems to be
moving towards, but it cannot have both. While even fairness,
in all likelihood, has a price, we simply cannot accept the
explanations out there, as they stand, for how cheaply it should
be sold away.
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